Ethiopia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, is causing alarm in the Horn of Africa with its aggressive posture and pursuit of access to the Red Sea. The possibility of a new war looms, and the region’s stability is at risk. Abiy’s statements about securing a sea port have sparked concerns among neighboring countries and Middle Eastern actors. The implications of this situation are significant and must be carefully considered to prevent further escalation and instability in the region.
Ethiopia’s desire for a sea port is not new. The country, with a population of 125 million people, is the world’s most-populous landlocked country. Historically, Ethiopian emperors, including Haile Selassie, considered access to the sea a top priority. Abiy has publicly expressed his intention to acquire a port, initially through peaceful means but also by force if necessary. While he denies plans to invade Eritrea, tensions are rising, and the possibility of conflict cannot be dismissed.
The Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab is the most likely target for Ethiopia. It was part of Ethiopia until Eritrean independence, and its strategic location makes it an attractive option. However, Eritrea has shown resistance and positioned itself as a responsible, status quo power. It has refused to engage in discussions on this matter, and its statements have been terse and acerbic. Ethiopia’s other neighbors, including Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, are joining Eritrea in forming an informal bloc to contain Ethiopia. This united front raises concerns about the potential for further instability in the region.
The involvement of Middle Eastern actors adds another layer of complexity to the situation. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is a major supporter of Abiy’s government, sees an opportunity in Ethiopia potentially becoming a Red Sea power and a client state. However, a new war in the Horn of Africa could jeopardize the UAE’s gains in Sudan, where it supports the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) group. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is sponsoring ceasefire talks in Sudan and reportedly worried about Abiy’s actions. If Abiy overreaches, Saudi Arabia may support Eritrea, despite its previous reservations.
For Abiy, the challenges of a potential war are twofold. Firstly, his military forces have been depleted by the previous conflicts, including the war against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The Ethiopia army has suffered significant casualties, and a new war would require active involvement from Tigray, which is war-weary and has its own grievances. Secondly, financing a war would strain the already struggling Ethiopian economy, which desperately needs financial assistance from Western donors, the IMF, and the World Bank. The UAE may provide some support, but it cannot compensate for the economic losses a war would entail.
The risks of a new war in the region are alarmingly high. Abiy’s aggressive stance has sparked an arms race, with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti increasing their military capabilities. Tigray’s proposed demobilization is on hold, and conflicts in Somalia could worsen. There is a danger that even a small incident could escalate into a full-scale war, destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa.
It is essential for all stakeholders to exercise restraint and prioritize dialogue and diplomatic solutions. A peaceful resolution is crucial to safeguard the stability and well-being of the region. International actors, including the United Nations and African Union, should play an active role in mediating tensions and facilitating negotiations. The potential consequences of a new war in the Horn of Africa are too significant to ignore, and concerted efforts must be made to prevent further escalation.
As the situation unfolds, it is crucial to closely monitor developments and remain cautious in interpreting statements and actions from all parties involved. Efforts should be focused on promoting peace, stability, and cooperation in the Horn of Africa, rather than fueling tensions and risking further conflict.
